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PROPORTIONALITY AND PRETENSE 
PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
AND THEIR LIMITATIONS. By Aharon Barak.1 New 
York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press. 2012. Pp. xxvi + 
611. $55.00 (paper). 
Grant Huscroft2 
The rule of law requires that state action that limits rights 
be justified in judicial review proceedings. 
Proportionality analysis is the best means of determining 
justification for rights limitations. 
Courts are uniquely well positioned to conduct 
proportionality analysis and should not defer to the other 
branches of government. 
Judicial review is democratic and courts should not be 
concerned about its legitimacy. 
Aharon Barak is a staunch proponent of judicial review 
and these are some of the claims he makes in Proportionality: 
Constitutional Rights and their Limitations, his contribution to 
the burgeoning literature on proportionality. Proportionality is 
an analytical framework used by courts in many countries in 
determining whether or not limitations on the exercise of rights 
are justified, and therefore constitutional. Barak’s agenda is 
ambitious: he is, as he describes it, “attempt[ing] to provide a 
universal understanding of the concept of proportionality in 
constitutional democracies” (p. 4). According to Barak, 
proportionality analysis can be used to resolve the most 
pressing problems a country may face—even threats to the 
continued existence of the country itself. Can Israel erect a 
 1. Faculty member, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya, Israel. Former 
Attorney General, Israel; former Justice and President, Israel Supreme Court. 
 2. Faculty of Law, Western University. Thanks to Larry Alexander, James Allan, 
Ran Hirschl, Bradley Miller, Richard Posner, Paul Rishworth, and Grégoire Webber for 
comments on an earlier draft. 
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security fence3 or limit family reunification involving non-Israeli 
spouses4 in an attempt to protect its citizens from terrorism? On 
Barak’s account the judiciary can, and must, answer these 
questions and more without any concerns about the legitimacy of 
judicial review. 
Barak is a jurist of considerable distinction whose legacy is 
admired by some and abhorred by others. To some he was the 
exemplary wise jurist who helped protect individual rights and 
keep state power in check; to others he was an activist judge 
who usurped democratic power.5 Views about his legacy differ 
widely, but there is no doubting his importance. Under his 
leadership the Supreme Court of Israel established the 
constitutional stature of Israel’s Basic Law: Human Liberty and 
Dignity (1992),6 and the decisions he wrote in interpreting and 
applying the Basic Law have left an indelible stamp on the law 
of Israel.7 Now in his retirement, Barak writes for an international 
 3. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v The Gov ‘t of Israel 58(5) IsrSC 807 
[2004] (Isr.). 
 4. HCJ 7052/03 Adalah—The Legal Ctr. for the Rights of the Arab Minority v 
Minister of the Interior, [2006] (Isr.). 
 5. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan once introduced Barak at an academic 
gathering as her “judicial hero,” describing him as “the judge or justice in my lifetime 
whom, I think, best represents and has best advanced the values of democracy and human 
rights, of the rule of law and of justice.” In contrast, Judge Robert Bork said Barak “may 
be the worst judge on the planet, the most activist” (quoted in Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Praise 
for an Israeli Judge Drives Criticism of Kagan, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2010, http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/06/25/us/politics/25kagan.html?_r=0). See also Richard Posner, 
Enlightened Despot, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 23, 2007, at 53; cf. Barak Medina, Four Myths 
of Judicial Review: A Response to Richard Posner’s Critique of Aharon Barak’s Judicial 
Activism 49 HARV INT. L.J. ONLINE 1 (2007).  
 6. The Basic Law: Human Liberty and Dignity was passed by the Israeli Knesset as 
ordinary legislation, but was interpreted by the Israel Supreme Court under Barak’s 
leadership as supreme law authorizing the Court to invalidate inconsistent legislation (CA 
6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank v Migdal Coop. Vill. 49(4) IsrSC 221 [1995] (Isr.)). This 
development was signaled by Barak in 1993 in A Constitutional Revolution: Israel’s Basic 
Laws, 4 CONST. F. 83 (1992-1993). Barak wrote:  
By virtue of this basic legislation, human rights in Israel have become legal norms 
of preferred constitutional status much like the situation in the United States, 
Canada and many other countries. This is clear with regard to Basic Law: 
Freedom of Occupation, which the Knesset itself entrenched by stipulating that 
it may not be changed except by a Basic Law passed by an absolute majority of 
Knesset members. It is less clear in the case of Basic Law: Human Dignity and 
Freedom, which was not so entrenched; but the minimalist interpretation of that 
Basic Law requires, in my opinion, that any ordinary legislation which contradicts 
the provisions of the Basic Law without stating explicitly that it is doing so will 
not be valid.  
Id. at 83. Barak concluded “Now that we have been given the tools we will do the work.” 
Id. at 84. 
 7. Much has been written about Barak’s influence and the evolution of judicial 
power in Israel. See, e.g. Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of Israel’s Juristocracy, 16 
CONSTELLATIONS 476 (2009); Markus Wagner, Transnational Legal Communication: A  
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audience. Although he acknowledges his predecessors in 
proportionality scholarship, and in particular the work of Robert 
Alexy,8 Barak is keen to demonstrate his differences with them 
and to promote his own approach to proportionality analysis. 
Barak exalts the courts as the ultimate guardians of 
constitutional rights and downplays the many and profound 
differences that exist between countries that have adopted bills 
of rights and proportionality review.9 The book is a tour of 
constitutional law, with Barak discussing case law and secondary 
literature from a wide range of countries including Australia, 
Canada, Germany, Ireland, Israel, India, New Zealand, South 
Africa, and the United States, with references to constitutions 
and statutes from Albania, Moldova, Portugal, Romania, Spain, 
Switzerland, and Turkey along the way. Few will be familiar with 
the full breadth of the material cited, so one has to take Barak’s 
account of the law on faith.10 But there is reason for caution: 
Barak affects an easy familiarity with matters of great subtlety 
and nuance in jurisdictions in which he has neither experience 
nor expertise.11 
Barak invites readers to draw a familiar conclusion: elected 
legislators are either insufficiently concerned about rights or are 
ignorant of them, and are prone to making reactionary judgments 
in the face of crises real and imagined. Thus, it falls to judges to 
protect democracy by requiring that governments justify their 
actions. In Barak’s world, legal justification—justification in 
Partial Legacy of Supreme Court President Aharon Barak, TULSA L. REV. 437, 456–460 
(2012). 
 8. Alexy is considered the leading German proportionality theorist. See ROBERT 
ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (Julian Rivers, trans., Oxford Univ. 
Press, 2002) (1986). Barak summarizes his differences with Alexy in the book (pp. 5–6). 
 9. The spread of proportionality analysis is discussed by Alec Stone Sweet and 
Jud Mathews in Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUMBIA 
J. TRANS. L. 73 (2008). 
 10. James Allan and I discuss some of the problems with comparative constitutional 
law in James Allan & Grant Huscroft, Constitutional Rights Coming Home to Roost? 
Rights Internationalism in American Courts, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2006); see also 
James Allan, Grant Huscroft & Nessa Lynch, The Citation of Overseas Authority in Rights 
Litigation in New Zealand: How Much Bark? How Much Bite?, 11 OTAGO L. REV. 433 
(2007) (discussing the inflationary (“ratcheting-up”) effect of judicial citation of 
comparative constitutional rights). 
 11. For example, Barak writes: “Today, the recognition of positive constitutional 
rights is widespread in constitutional democracies (p. 423).” He cites a single case from the 
Supreme Court of Canada, Gosselin v Quebec (Attorney General) [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 
(Can.), for the proposition. But that case is noteworthy for its rejection of the proposition 
Barak suggests it stands for (majority of the Court rejecting argument that the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms establishes positive obligation on the state to guarantee 
adequate living standards, Gosselin, at ¶¶ 81–83).  
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judicial review proceedings—is all that really matters and there is 
no room for doubt about its importance. Nor is there any reason 
to doubt the legitimacy of judicial review and, as a result, no 
reason for judges to limit its scope or to be deferential in 
exercising judicial authority. “[I]t is essential to understand,” he 
insists, “that, once a legal system has chosen—either explicitly or 
implicitly—to recognize the institution of judicial review of the 
constitutionality of statutes, the critique leveled at the adoption 
of judicial review in the first place should not emerge again when 
judicial review is applied” (p. 382). Courts simply must determine 
whether limits on rights are justified and, if they are not, simply 
must strike them down. To fail to do so is to abdicate judicial 
responsibility. 
Barak argues that proportionality is the best means to make 
sense of all of this—the best approach to determining whether or 
not limits on rights are justified and the best means of protecting 
constitutional rights—and sets out a detailed approach to each 
step in the analysis. For all of the pretense, however, 
proportionality analysis suffers from the same basic problem as all 
other approaches to judicial review: it cannot provide answers 
that cannot reasonably be denied. Judicial review is problematic 
no matter what approach to rights analysis is adopted, and 
proportionality analysis gives rise to a unique range of problems 
that Barak cannot overcome. 
The problems begin with the rigid bifurcation of definition 
and justification on which proportionality analysis is premised. 
Rights must be defined before justification for limits on them can 
be assessed, but no matter how broadly a particular right is 
defined the real protection it affords depends on how easy or 
difficult it is to justify the establishment of limits on the right.12 As 
we will see, the importance of the justificatory inquiry establishes 
an incentive for courts to minimize or even avoid questions of 
constitutional text and its interpretation at the definitional 
stage—the traditional focus of judicial review. As the focus of 
judicial review shifts the scope of rights expands, and with 
expanded rights comes an expansion in the scope of judicial 
review, as more and more state action is found to establish limits 
on the rights the courts have expanded. But while proportionality 
analysis leads to an expansion of rights and broadens the scope of 
 12. See, e.g., Bradley W. Miller, Justification and Rights Limitations, in EXPOUNDING 
THE CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 93 (Grant Huscroft, ed., 
2008); GRÉGOIRE C.N. WEBBER, THE NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTION: ON THE 
LIMITATION OF RIGHTS (2009) .  
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judicial review, it limits the bases on which limits on rights may be 
justified. It prescribes an ostensibly objective, evidence-based 
assessment that all but bars the state from defending rights 
limitations on moral bases.13 Barak is comfortable with this state 
of affairs but there is no reason the rest of us should be. It is 
nothing to which we agreed—or would have agreed—in 
establishing a democratic constitutional order. 
WHAT RIGHTS DO WE HAVE? 
The first question that must be asked in any rights-based 
constitutional order is: what rights do we have? This ostensibly 
simple question is not likely to be answered by the text of a bill of 
rights—at least, not definitively—because the text of bills of rights 
is worded vaguely. In order to determine whether a particular 
right is protected by a bill of rights, courts must determine what 
the vaguely worded text of a bill of rights means. Only after this 
has occurred can they go on to determine whether a particular 
right has been limited by state action, and only then does the 
burden of justification arise. 
Barak pays more attention than many proportionality 
proponents to questions of constitutional interpretation and 
reiterates the “purposive” approach to constitutional 
interpretation he detailed in previous work.14 There is 
something here for everyone. On one hand, Barak favors 
progressive, evolving conceptions of constitutional rights (pp. 
46–47);15 on the other hand, he disavows overly expansive 
interpretation: the constitution “is not like clay in the sculptor’s 
hands” (p. 49).16 Text matters, he insists; at the same time, 
 13. Bradley W. Miller, Proportionality’s Blind Spot: ‘Neutrality’ and Political 
Philosophy, in PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW: RIGHTS, JUSTIFICATION, 
REASONING (Huscroft, Miller & Webber, eds., forthcoming, 2014). 
 14. AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW (Sari Bashi, trans., 2005).  
 15. Citing Hunter v Southam Inc, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (Can.). 
 16. “A constitution is not a metaphor. The Constitutional text is not a non-binding 
recommendation. It is not like clay in the sculptor’s hands. The idea of constitutional 
amendments through judicial interpretation—rather than through the mechanisms set by 
the constitution itself—is merely a metaphor” (p. 49) (internal citation omitted). 
Elsewhere in the text, Barak states that a change in the scope of a right may come “only 
via constitutional amendment” or, he adds immediately, “a change in the court’s 
interpretation of the constitutional text” (p. 23). There is a significant issue here about 
when interpretive change is tantamount to change to the constitution itself. See Grant 
Huscroft, Vagueness, Finiteness, and the Limits of Interpretation and Construction, in THE 
CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 203 
(Grant Huscroft & Bradley Miller eds., 2011).  
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however, so does “implicit text”—constitutional text he 
describes as written in “invisible ink” (p. 50). 
The suggestion here is that the drafters of a bill of rights 
agreed to include particular text but to hide it from view. Why 
would they do so? And even assuming that they did, why should 
judges give effect to their subterfuge? The invisible ink 
metaphor is inapt, however, for invisible ink is apparent to 
anyone that has the right medium for viewing it. Only judges can 
see the text Barak has in mind.17 Thus, judges can exercise 
discretionary authority to read rights into a bill of rights. The 
extent to which this is legitimate is, of course, controversial, 
unless we assume that there is no distinction between the 
constitution and what judges say about the constitution.18 
Despite his insistence that constitutional text matters, what 
Barak describes as text-specific rights turn out to be “framing” 
rights, each of which includes a “bundle of rights”19—again, 
recognized by judges—that are also to be regarded as explicit 
rather than implicit rights.20 
Barak’s conception of the interpretive task is at odds with 
much of what we know about bills of rights. The text of bills of 
rights is likely to be chosen carefully—indeed, painstakingly—in 
order to achieve the agreement in the political community 
necessary to adopt bills of rights. The drafters of bills of rights think 
that the words they choose matter; they think that their agreements 
to include particular rights and to omit others will be understood 
and respected. To be sure, agreement to the adoption of a bill of 
rights is often achieved at the expense of clarity or specificity: 
 17. Barak’s citation of decisions of the High Court of Australia finding an 
implicit right of political expression in the Australian Constitution is telling. Barak 
notes in passing that reasonable people may disagree about the boundaries of implicit 
text, but the disagreement is more profound than he acknowledges: It goes to the very 
existence of implicit text, especially in Australia, which deliberately chose not to 
constitutionalize the protection of rights and has since rejected proposals to adopt 
even a statutory bill of rights. See Goldsworthy’s forceful critique: Jeffrey Goldsworthy, 
Unwritten Constitutional Principles, in EXPOUNDING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 
12, at 277. 
 18. United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Hughes’ offhand comment—“We are 
under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is,” is neither 
descriptively apt nor a normatively desirable conception of constitutionalism, but it is 
sometimes cited as authority. See, e.g., PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF 
CANADA (2013), ch 5.5(b); cf. Grant Huscroft, Thank God We ‘re Here, 25 SUPREME 
COURT L. REV. (2d) 241, 249–52 (2004). 
 19. Barak cites Spanish secondary authority (C.B. PULIDO, EL PRINCIPIO DE 
PROPORCIONALIDAD Y LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES (2007)) (p. 51 N. 27). 
 20. Barak refers to framing rights and the rights to which they give rise as “parent 
and child” rights. (p. 51).  
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important provisions in bills of rights may be worded more or less 
vaguely in order to facilitate their adoption.21 This allows 
agreement to be reached at a level of abstraction—to broad 
concepts rather than particular conceptions, about which there may 
be considerable disagreement. Once a vaguely worded bill of rights 
is adopted, the question is: how will judges see their role? 
One thing is certain: no serious conception of 
constitutionalism and the rule of law allows judges to treat 
vaguely worded provisions as open-ended—allows them to 
exploit generality and abstraction in order to ascribe any 
normatively desirable meaning they choose to the text. Bills of 
rights may be worded vaguely, but vagueness is not the same as 
radical indeterminacy. We can concede that rights may be 
underdeterminate, in that their text does not fully determine the 
scope of the protection they provide, but judicial interpretive 
discretion is not unfettered.22 If it is to be exercised legitimately, it 
must be anchored in not only the text of the bill of rights but also 
the agreement that it reflects. 
That is so because bills of rights effect a “constitutional 
settlement” in the community as to how rights are to be dealt with 
in the constitutional order. Bills of rights are not generic; they are 
specific to particular legal communities and their provisions 
reflect the values, traditions, and legal norms of the communities 
that adopt them. To adopt a bill of rights is to adopt a particular 
bill of rights—a bill of rights that includes some rights, and 
perhaps particular conceptions of them, and omits other rights, 
leaving their protection to the ordinary democratic processes.23 I 
suspect that Barak is unsympathetic to the constitutional 
settlement idea because Israel’s constitutional experience is so 
different. But if he is unsympathetic, Barak understands the need 
to at least affect concern with questions of legitimacy, and so there 
is a nod to originalism and other constraints on judicial 
interpretive discretion. Constitutional text cannot be understood, 
he says, without taking into account the intentions of their 
 21. Jeremy Waldron describes this as “finess[ing] major disagreements.” Jeremy 
Waldron, Do Judges Reason Morally?, in EXPOUNDING THE CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 12, at 38, 63. 
 22. Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 
U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 473 (1987). 
 23. I say omits, rather than excludes, because bills of rights list the rights they include 
but rarely exclude rights from their protection explicitly. They are, nevertheless, finite 
documents, because they do not include all possible rights. I set out the argument more 
fully in Grant Huscroft, Proportionality and the Relevance of Interpretation” in 
PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 13.  
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creators and the original understanding (pp. 58, 63). But this is 
qualified immediately: interpretation is an objective as well as 
subjective enterprise, and the objective purpose is to be accorded 
greater weight. 
Barak describes his purposive approach—considering the 
past but not allowing it to control—as well-accepted by many 
Western legal systems and laments the refusal of American courts 
to adopt it. American constitutional law is, he writes, “in a state 
of crisis . . . the entire constitutional system is hanging in the 
balance . . . [a] dangerous situation, which may tear apart the legal 
system . . . .” (pp. 62–63). This will come as a considerable surprise 
to American scholars. So too will Barak’s approach to 
interpreting rights, which results in very broad conceptions of 
rights—so broad that rights come to protect much that is 
valueless, if not harmful. Consider the example of theft. Is there a 
constitutional right to steal? The answer is yes, Barak says, 
because this is a right that flows from human autonomy, which he 
assumes democratic constitutions must protect (pp. 42–44).24 
There is no need for concern, however; Barak assures us that 
proportionality analysis will accommodate the required criminal 
law prohibition. The claim is, in essence, that judges can be trusted 
to act reasonably in cutting down to size the rights whose scope 
they are prone to exaggerate.25 
But no matter how good a job judges are thought likely to do, 
the important point for Barak is that judges must be allowed to 
determine the matter. If it important to justify state action, and 
proportionality analysis determines justification, it follows that 
the opportunities for courts to engage in proportionality analysis 
should be maximized. The best way to do this is to adopt broad 
interpretations of rights. After all, the more broadly a right is 
interpreted, the more likely it is that state action will come into 
conflict with it and proportionality analysis will be required in 
order to determine whether the state action is justified. 
Some have sought to normalize, if not advocate, this 
relationship. For example, in the context of an argument for 
 24. Barak states that he assumes, along with Alexy, “that a democratic constitution 
recognizes a general right to private autonomy.” This is an enormous assumption, and 
although Barak acknowledges that it is the subject of dispute, he simply puts the dispute 
to one side (p. 42 n. 86). 
 25. Barak’s example is taken to the extreme by Möller, who writes of a right to 
commit murder. See Kai Möller, Proportionality and Rights Inflation, in 
PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 13. Cf. Grégoire C.N. Webber, 
On the Loss of Rights, in the same volume.  
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proportionality as the “ultimate rule of law,” David Beatty 
suggests that we ignore the particularity of bills of rights: 
“Traditional first-generation rights of liberty and equality are all 
any judge who is inclined to read constitutional texts to give effect 
to their overarching values and purposes really needs.”26 
Proportionality, says Beatty, “entails very little interpretation and 
makes the concept of rights almost irrelevant”;27 “when judges 
rely on the principle of proportionality to structure their thinking 
the concept of rights disappears. . . . They are really just rhetorical 
flourish.”28 “[P]roportionality transforms judicial review from an 
interpretive exercise, giving meaning to the words of a 
constitutional text, into a very focused factual inquiry about the 
good and bad effects of specific acts of the state.”29 Mattias Kumm 
makes a similar argument: 
[A] rights-holder does not have very much in virtue of his 
having a right. More specifically, the fact that a rights holder 
has a prima facie right does not imply that he holds a position 
that gives him any kind of priority over countervailing 
considerations of policy. An infringement of the scope of a 
right merely serves as a trigger to initiate an assessment of 
whether the infringement is justified. . . . The second 
characteristic feature of rights reasoning is the flip side of the 
first. Since comparatively little is decided by acknowledging 
that a measure infringes a right, the focus of rights adjudication 
is generally on the reasons that justify the infringement.30 
If rights infringements are no more than triggers for justificatory 
evaluations, there are, Kumm asserts, “no obvious reasons” for 
defining rights narrowly.31 
I can think of one: broad interpretations of rights change the 
constitutional order by rendering all legislation vulnerable to 
constitutional challenge. Given the broad interpretation thesis, 
legislation will be found to limit rights routinely, no matter what 
a bill of rights says (or does not say). This establishes a burden 
of legal justification on the state, and if this burden is not met 
 26. DAVID M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW 138 (2004). 
 27. Id. at 160. 
 28. Id. at 171.  
 29. Id. at 182–83. 
 30. Mattias Kumm, The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification: 
The Point of Rights-Based Proportionality Review, 4 LAW & ETHICS OF HUM. RTS. 150 
(2010). Kumm acknowledges the compatibility of Rawlsian public reason with 
proportionality reasoning, but denies that his argument depends on Rawls’ conception of 
public reason. Id. at 150 n. 46. 
 31. Id. at 151.   
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the law will be found unconstitutional. It is easy to be sanguine 
about all of this if it is assumed that it is easy to establish 
proportionality to the satisfaction of a court. But what reason is 
there to make this assumption? 
Here we come to the nub of the matter: the protection that 
constitutional rights afford ultimately depends on how easy or 
difficult courts make it for the state to meet the burden of 
justification. Proportionality proponents are in a tough position 
at this point. It is difficult to insist that broad interpretations of 
rights are necessary given the importance of submitting state 
action to justification, only to make it easy for the state to meet 
the burden of justification and so render the exercise 
meaningless. 
Kai Möller’s approach highlights this problem. Möller seeks 
to make a virtue of interpretive slackness, as he not only 
acknowledges “rights inflation” but advocates it. The point of 
rights, he says, 
is not to single out certain especially important interests for 
heightened protection. Rather, it is to show a particular form 
of respect for persons by insisting that each and every state 
measure which affects a person’s ability to live her life 
according to her self-conception must take her autonomy 
interests adequately into account.32 
For Möller then, bills of rights establish a single right: a right to 
do whatever one wishes, and as a result all government action 
necessarily establishes limits on this right and must be justified. 
Would anyone ever agree to adopt a bill of rights that 
included such a right? This appears not to matter in the least. 
For Möller, as for Kumm and Beatty, the concept of rights is 
all but meaningless. On their account, bills of rights are really 
not bills of rights at all. Instead, they are simply requirements 
of proportionality in state action—a universal obligation that 
state action be justified in accordance with a proportionality 
test. 
It is impossible to reconcile this conception of bills of rights 
with the constitutional settlement concept I outlined above. The 
Beatty/Kumm/Möller approach renders the constitutionality of 
all validly enacted legislation contingent on judicial approval, on 
the basis that it satisfies a proportionality standard that may be 
 32. Möller, Proportionality and Rights Inflation, in PROPORTIONALITY AND THE 
RULE OF LAW, supra note 13.  
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applied in a more or less exacting manner.33 Kumm answers the 
obvious criticism rhetorically: “The question is not what justifies 
the  ‘countermajoritarian’ imposition of outcomes by non-elected 
judges. The question is what justifies the authority of a legislative 
decision, when it can be established with sufficient certainty that 
it imposes burdens on individuals for which there is no reasonable 
justification.”34 
To accept this approach we must accept that attempts to limit 
the scope of rights by careful drafting, and hence to limit the scope 
of judicial review, are doomed to fail. The process of constitution 
writing—negotiating, compromising, and ultimately agreeing on 
the adoption of constitutional text—is, in essence, a waste of time: 
Judicial review simply cannot be constrained by the text of a bill 
of rights.35 The best that can be hoped for is that courts will 
exercise their judicial review powers modestly or deferentially. 
This is not an attractive conception of democratic 
constitutionalism, but for all of the problems with it Beatty/
Kumm/Möller are at least candid in advocating it. Their goal is 
clear for all to see: they like judicial review and seek to expand its 
scope. They regard interpretive theory as a sort of annoying 
legalism courts are free to ignore,36 and advocate expansive 
interpretations of rights as a means of achieving an expansion in 
the scope of judicial review authority. Does Barak share this 
agenda? 
If he does not advocate it it is doubtful that he opposes it. My 
sense is that the judge in him precludes him from endorsing the 
radical approach to constitutional rights that Beatty/Kumm/
Möller advocate. But Barak’s approach goes almost as far and 
delivers congenial results: broad interpretations of rights and 
increased, if not unlimited, scope to engage in proportionality 
review. And as we will see, Barak’s approach has the potential to 
go further, given his antipathy to the concept of deference. 
 33. I say “more or less” because most (but not all) proportionality proponents 
assume that proportionality analysis will be applied deferentially. The topic of 
proportionality and deference is discussed below.  
 34. Kumm, Socratic Contestation, supra note 30, at 170 (internal footnote omitted). 
 35. Indeed, the ability of the people to amend their constitution may turn out to be 
illusory as well. Barak flirts with the notion of “unconstitutional constitutional 
amendments”: some amendments are “so fundamentally contrary to the basic structure of 
the constitution itself that they may no longer be considered  ‘fit’ for the process of a 
constitutional amendment” (p. 31). 
 36. Kumm deprecates legalism—a focus on text, history, and precedent—as 
characteristic of originalist as well as living constitutionalism approaches, and describes a 
“vice of thoughtlessness based on tradition, convention or preference[.]” See Kumm, 
Socratic Contestation, supra note 30, at 163 & n. 44.  
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THE NATURE OF PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS 
Proportionality analysis is not concerned with determining 
what rights we have.37 It is concerned with determining the extent 
to which the rights we have may justifiably be limited by the state, 
but there is no doubt that this determines how meaningful the 
rights we have will turn out to be. 
As Barak puts it, proportionality is “the set of rules 
determining the necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
limitation of a constitutionally protected right by a law to be 
constitutionally permissible” (p. 3).38 There are subtle variations 
in proportionality analysis across legal systems, but it is common 
for courts to ask these four questions, and to place the burden of 
justification on the state: 
1. Is the limit on the right established for a proper 
purpose?; 
2. Are the means adopted to achieve that purpose 
rationally connected to the achievement of that purpose? 
(rationality); 
3. Are the means adopted necessary to achieve that 
purpose, in the sense that alternative means could not 
achieve the purpose while limiting the protected right to 
a lesser extent? (necessity); and 
4. Is there proportionality between the gain in achieving 
the purpose and the loss occasioned by limiting the 
protected right (proportionality stricto sensu)? 
The purpose of each of these questions differs considerably. 
The first three establish a means-end analysis: the state’s purpose 
is identified and the effectiveness and impact of the means chosen 
by the state to achieve that purpose are considered. Barak spends 
a good deal of time discussing the propriety of a state’s purpose in 
limiting rights—the sorts of state purposes that can, in principle, 
justify the establishment of limits on rights and the degree of 
urgency that is required in realizing proper purposes. But there is 
almost always a good reason for states to establish limits on rights, 
especially given the tendency to define the protected rights 
broadly. Given Barak’s concession that “most rights are relative 
 37. See Grégoire C.N. Webber, On the Loss of Rights, in PROPORTIONALITY AND 
THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 13. 
 38. Elsewhere in the book, Barak describes proportionality as establishing “a 
uniform analytical framework for any state action that may affect constitutional rights . . . 
a structured method of thought . . . that should not be identified with any  ‘right-wing’ or  
‘left-wing’ social theories” (pp. 459–60).  
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in nature and therefore can be limited” (p. 250), the only question 
is why a court would intervene at the first stage of the inquiry—
why, that is, a court would conclude that legislation is 
unconstitutional on the basis that it disapproves of the state’s end 
rather than the means chosen to achieve that end. 
The most important issue at the first stage of the 
proportionality inquiry is one of characterization—whether a law 
will be accorded a general or more specific purpose. For example, 
legislation requiring health warnings on tobacco products can be 
understood, in general, as an attempt to protect people from 
health risks.39 More specifically, however, it may be understood as 
an attempt to discourage people from smoking.40 The former 
characterization makes the law seem more important and might 
be thought to support the establishment of more extensive 
limitations on the freedom of expression. That is, a more 
important end is likely to provide the state with greater latitude 
when it comes to questions of means, given the range of policy 
options available.41 
Barak offers a complicated subjective-objective inquiry for 
identifying a proper purpose, but at the end of the day it is difficult 
to avoid the conclusion that the attribution of purpose to 
legislation that limits rights is more or less discretionary in nature. 
That being so, the important questions concern means-end fit.42 
There are two considerations here: rationality and necessity. 
Rationality receives relatively brief treatment by Barak. 
Law that limits rights need not achieve the state’s purpose 
completely; it is enough that the law contributes to the 
achievement of that purpose, provided only that the 
contribution be more than marginal or negligible (p. 305). In 
contrast to his approach to determining purpose, Barak’s 
approach to rationality leaves little room for judicial discretion. 
The question is empirical: does the means chosen by the 
legislature contribute meaningfully to achieving the 
 39. This is how Alexy characterizes it. See ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 402 (describing the proportionality of mandatory warnings on 
tobacco packages as a limit on the freedom of occupation that is “obvious” in terms of its 
justification, approving of the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court in 
BVerfGE vol. 95, 173). 
 40. RJR-MacDonald, Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (Can.) 
(majority of Court finding law banning tobacco advertising and requiring unattributed 
warnings on tobacco packages an unjustified limit on freedom of expression). 
 41. See also WEBBER, THE NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTION, supra note 12, at 72–75. 
 42. Martin Luterán, The Lost Meaning of Proportionality, in PROPORTIONALITY 
AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 13.  
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legislature’s end? If so, the law is rational, even if the court 
considers that better policy choices could have been made. 
On Barak’s approach, the rationality step in proportionality 
analysis is largely a waste of time. Legislatures simply do not pass 
irrational laws, given the minimal sense of rationality Barak 
contemplates. We would be better off without this step, lest courts 
take it too seriously.43 
Barak concedes that the concept of rationality could be 
discarded (p. 316).44 Thus, means-end fit boils down to the 
requirement of necessity. Necessity is a difficult test that invites 
second-guessing about legislative policy choices. Judges often 
make the claim that the state should not go after a fly with an 
elephant gun, but this is rarely a fair appraisal of a necessity 
problem. There are likely to be subtle rather than dramatic 
variations between the options that were considered and the one 
that was chosen, and choices are likely to be made in situations of 
imperfect knowledge. A limit on a right is necessary if there is no 
alternative approach to achieving the state’s purpose that limits 
the right to a lesser extent, but this question depends on a court’s 
ability to determine that the alternative approach fulfills the 
state’s purpose “quantitatively, qualitatively, and probability-
wise” (p. 324). The notion that these questions can be answered 
on the basis of evidential submissions in judicial proceedings is 
difficult to take seriously, and this difficulty goes to the heart of 
the problem: Proportionality analysis purports to be based on 
objective evidence. That judges have no plausible claim to the 
policy-making expertise the analysis requires is simply beside the 
point. 
The necessity test is the most important step in Canadian 
proportionality analysis, and most laws that are found to be 
unconstitutional fail on the basis that the limits they establish are 
not necessary. In short, they go too far in limiting rights. Barak 
once considered that the demonstration of necessity was at the 
“heart” of the proportionality analysis,45 but he now resiles from 
 43. Discussion of rationality features prominently in Canadian law, but there are few 
examples of cases in which a law has been held unconstitutional on the basis of 
irrationality. Ironically, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a law presuming that drugs 
were possessed for purposes of trafficking was  unconstitutional on the basis of irrationality 
in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.), the case that established proportionality analysis 
in Canadian law, but it is widely considered that the Court’s conclusion is erroneous. 
 44. “We will admit it is not that significant. Its entire purpose is to provide a quick 
solution in extreme cases where the incongruence between the means and the purpose is 
obvious, and by that to expedite the process of constitutional review” (p. 316). 
 45. United Mizrahi Bank, supra note 6, at ¶ 95.  
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that view. Necessity is important, he says, but proportionality 
stricto sensu is the most important step in proportionality 
analysis (pp. 337–39). 
In taking this position Barak aligns himself with the weight 
of proportionality scholarship. He acknowledges that it is easier 
for a court to conclude that a law is unjustified on the basis that it 
is badly designed—that the same purpose could be achieved in a 
manner that limits rights to a lesser extent—than it is to conclude 
that a properly designed law is unjustified because the rights-
interests tradeoff it effects is disproportionate stricto sensu. The 
former conclusion entails only a failure of “Pareto optimality,”46 a 
failure that can—at least in theory—be demonstrated on the basis 
of objective evidence.47 The latter conclusion is problematic 
because the interests and rights on both sides of the 
proportionality scale are incommensurate: they can be neither 
measured nor weighed by a common metric. 
The determination of proportionality stricto sensu depends 
on discretionary judgments as to the inputs and the weight the 
court chooses to assign to them. As a result, it is often said that 
the concept is arbitrary.48 This appears to be borne out in practice. 
A conclusion that a limit on a right is proportional or 
disproportional is more likely to be declared than demonstrated.49 
The objection from incommensurability is significant, and yet 
there is no denying that judgments made under the rubric of 
proportionality may reflect shared intuitions about justice, and to 
 46. Barak (p. 320 n. 12) cites Julian Rivers, Proportionality and the Variable Intensity 
of Review, 65 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 174, 198 (2006): “A distribution is efficient or Pareto-
optimal if no other distribution could make at least one person better off without making 
any one else worse off. Likewise an act is necessary if no alternative act could make the 
victim better off in terms of right-enjoyment without reducing the level of realization of 
some other constitutional interest.” 
 47. I say “in theory” because the concept of Pareto optimality is fraught with 
difficulty in the context of social policy choices. As Larry Alexander pointed out in his 
comments to me, legislatures typically have mixed rather than singular state goals, and any 
alternative policy is likely to disserve one or more of the state’s goals to some extent. 
 48. Robert Alexy, Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality, RATIO JURIS 
131 (2003) (replying to JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg, 
trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992)); cf. Frederick Schauer, Balancing, Subsumption and the 
Constraining Role of Legal Text, in INSTITUTIONAL REASON: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF 
ROBERT ALEXY 307 (Mattias Klatt, ed., 2012); Timothy Endicott, Proportionality and 
Incommensurability, in PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 13. 
 49. Grégoire Webber makes the same point in WEBBER, THE NEGOTIABLE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 12 at 89: “[T]he way in which the principle of proportionality 
generates particular conclusions is difficult to discern: concluding whether legislation  
‘strikes the right balance’ or is  ‘proportionate’ in relation to constitutional rights is, in 
many instances, asserted rather than demonstrated” (footnotes omitted).  
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that extent may seem unobjectionable. Everyone would agree, for 
example, that a penalty of life imprisonment for the crime of 
shoplifting would be excessive—overly severe or, we might say, 
out of all proportion to the harm caused by commission of the 
crime. We could go further and describe the penalty as not simply 
disproportionate but grossly disproportionate. Everyone would 
agree that such a penalty would be unjust, but of course this 
example is easy precisely because such penalty would never be 
imposed. It is so far beyond our experience as to be unthinkable 
in any civilized country, and branding the law “disproportional” 
involves no judgment of moment. Once we move beyond the 
range of extreme hypotheticals, however, the nature and quality 
of justice are contestable and the shortcomings of proportionality 
are laid bare. 
Consider the penalty for murder, a crime of a different order 
of magnitude than shoplifting. Murder is the ultimate immoral 
action; it is taboo in every religion and culture and prohibited by 
law in every civilized society. But despite unanimity on the 
immorality of murder, there is no consensus on the 
proportionality of particular punishments for the crime. Some 
states have capital punishment; some states penalize murder with 
life imprisonment without possibility of parole; and some states 
have finite sentences that permit early release. Reasonable people 
disagree about which of these approaches is preferable, but all of 
these punishments—even capital punishment—can be defended 
using the language of proportionality.50 
The shortcomings of proportionality analysis are not limited 
to the most serious laws. Consider an anodyne regulatory 
requirement, such as a law requiring that people be photographed 
in order to obtain a driver’s license. The purpose of such a law is, 
presumably, to protect the integrity of the drivers licensing 
system, but a photograph requirement establishes a limit on the 
freedom of religion of those whose understanding of the Second 
Commandment prohibits photographs, and in a legal system 
committed to proportionality the question is whether the 
photograph requirement can be justified despite the limit on 
 50. As I was writing this, the European Court of Human Rights concluded that 
English law allowing “whole life” sentences without the possibility of parole violated 
article 3 of the European Convention, which provides: “No one shall be subjected to 
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Vintner and Others v United 
Kingdom (July 9, 2013). The Court’s decision emphasized the importance of rehabilitation 
rather than punishment, without explaining why the state was not permitted to prefer the 
latter to the former.  
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freedom of religion it effects. This is precisely the sort of claim 
about which reasonable people are bound to disagree, and so it 
comes as no surprise that it divided the Supreme Court of Canada 
in Hutterian Brethren v. Alberta.51 
Judicial decisions in these sorts of cases betray the fact that 
the outcome of proportionality analysis is influenced by unspoken 
assumptions about the importance of particular rights and their 
exercise in particular circumstances. A judge who is 
unsympathetic to a particular rights claim is less likely to find the 
establishment of a limit on the relevant right to be 
disproportionate than a judge who considers the right important, 
and hence considers the limit on the right to be more significant. 
The difference is clear in the Hutterian Brethren case, in which the 
majority trivializes a freedom of religion claim the minority 
characterizes as “dramatic.”52 Barak acknowledges the problem, 
as we will see, but his approach to dealing with it raises as many 
questions as it answers. 
PROPORTIONALITY AND THE “CULTURE  
OF JUSTIFICATION” 
Proportionality analysis is often justified on the assumption 
that it is synonymous with justification, and it goes without saying 
that requiring justification for state action is a good thing. 
Proportionality is said to establish and support a “culture of 
justification,” a phrase coined by Etienne Mureinik, in his 
discussion of the then-nascent South African Constitution. 
Mureneik expressed his hope that South Africa could overcome 
its racist, authoritarian past and become democratic. In an oft-
quoted passage he stated: 
If the new Constitution is a bridge away from a culture of 
authority, it is clear what it must be a bridge to. It must lead to 
 51. Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567 (Can.). The 
Court split 4:3 in upholding the constitutionality of the law. 
 52. Writing for the majority of the Court, Chief Justice McLachlin noted that the 
Hutterites, who live in remote rural communities, had options including hiring drivers as 
necessary: “While the limit imposes costs in terms of money and inconvenience as the price 
of maintaining the religious practice of not submitting to photos, it does not deprive 
members of their ability to live in accordance with their beliefs. Its deleterious effects, 
while not trivial, fall at the less serious end of the scale.” Hutterian Brethren at ¶102. Abella 
J, writing for the minority, describes the harm to the freedom of religion of the Hutterites 
as “dramatic”: “Their inability to drive affects them not only individually, but also severely 
compromises the autonomous character of their religious community.” Id. at ¶ 114. 
Ironically, both sides cite an earlier article by Aharon Barak, Proportional Effect: The 
Israeli Experience, 57 U. Toronto L.J. 369 (2007).  
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a culture of justification—a culture in which every exercise of 
power is expected to be justified; in which the leadership given 
by government rests on the cogency of the case offered in 
defence of its decisions, not the fear inspired by the force at its 
command. The new order must be a community built on 
persuasion, not coercion.53 
Mureneik’s “culture of justification” is usually invoked 
without regard to the South African context in which he coined 
the phrase. In well-established constitutional democracies, 
justification does not depend on the possibility of judicial review. 
Consider Australia, which has no national bill of rights: its laws 
are justified in democratic political terms. 
Barak’s endorsement of the “culture of justification” (p. 458) 
is best understood as reflecting a normative preference for legal 
over political constitutionalism—in short, for rights-based judicial 
review. The motivation for this is well expressed by Cohen-Eliya 
and Porat: 
[The culture of justification] is based on rationalism and elitism 
that are thought of as bulwarks against the prejudice and 
irrationality of unchecked popular democracy. In contrast to 
the culture of authority, the culture of justification is not 
content with authority and legitimacy based on populism. It is 
suspicious of letting popularly elected bodies decide for 
themselves, and requires instead that they provide justification 
for their actions to external professional and elitist bodies, such 
as the courts.54 
Barak is an unabashed elitist when it comes to judicial 
review. Although he is forced to acknowledge the relevance of 
majority rule, his conception of democracy diminishes its 
importance by separating the “formal” and “substantive” aspects 
of democracy: 
Democracy is not merely majority rule. Democracy is also the 
rule of fundamental values and human rights as expressed by 
the constitution. Democracy is a delicate balance between 
majority rule and fundamental values that control that 
majority. Democracy is not only “formal democracy” (which is 
primarily concerned with the election process of the 
representative institutions guaranteeing the majority rule). 
Democracy is also “substantive democracy” (which is primarily 
 53. Etienne Mureinik, A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights, 10 
S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 31, 32 (1994) (emphasis added). 
 54. Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, Proportionality and the Culture of 
Justification, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 463, 483 (2011).  
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concerned with the protection of human rights) . . . Remove 
majority rule from the constitutional democracy, and you have 
offended its very nature. Take fundamental-value rule away 
from a constitutional democracy, and you have offended its 
very existence. 55 
Barak insists that there is no basis for concern about the 
democratic legitimacy of judicial review once the decision has 
been made to adopt it.56 In effect, the democratic pedigree of a 
decision to adopt judicial review immunizes the exercise of 
judicial review authority from criticism on democratic grounds. 
This is a strong point, and it is undermined by Barak’s 
qualification that the decision to adopt judicial review reflects the 
democratic will of the people even if the decision is implicit.57 
But the larger problem is that the democratic pedigree of the 
decision to adopt judicial review has nothing at all to say about 
how judicial review should be practiced—what its scope is or 
ought to be, and in particular whether proportionality analysis 
should be employed. The most that can be said is that the people 
have, through democratic means, authorized the judiciary to 
exercise the power of judicial review. It does not follow that each 
and every exercise of judicial power is democratically legitimate. 
Again, only a judge could say such a thing. But most judges at 
least affect modesty when it comes to exercising their power, and 
most are cautious in exercising their power to invalidate 
legislation no matter how well established a court’s judicial review 
authority may be. Consider the various ways in which American 
judges may seek to limit the scope and impact of judicial review 
 55. CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank v Migdal Coop. Vill. 49(4) IsrSC 221 [1995] 
(Isr.), quoted in Barak (p. 253). Barak’s conception of democracy is the sort that Allan has 
characterized as “fat”: See James Allan, Thin Beats Fat Yet Again—Conceptions of 
Democracy, 25 LAW & PHIL. 533 (2006). 
 56. Barak is not the first judge to make this claim. Writing in the early days of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Justice Lamer of the Supreme Court of Canada 
rejected an argument warning of the dangers of judicial activism as follows: 
This is an argument which was heard countless times prior to the entrenchment 
of the Charter but which has in truth, for better or for worse, been settled by the 
very coming into force of the Constitution Act, 1982. It ought not to be forgotten 
that the historic decision to entrench the Charter in our Constitution was taken 
not by the courts but by the elected representatives of the people of Canada. It 
was those representatives who extended the scope of constitutional adjudication 
and entrusted the courts with this new and onerous responsibility. Adjudication 
under the Charter must be approached free of any lingering doubts as to its 
legitimacy.  
In re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 497 (Can.). 
 57. This qualification is necessary given Barak’s role in constitutionalizing the Basic 
Law and judicial review. Given that role, it is more than a little presumptuous of him to 
declare democracy-based concerns irrelevant. See supra note 6.  
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by applying doctrines such as mootness, ripeness, or political 
questions, or the various avoidance techniques set out in the 
Ashwander doctrine.58 Judges in other jurisdictions are not quite 
so cautious, but most are likely to take a deferential approach to 
judicial review, even when they have no concerns as to its 
legitimacy. Barak has little time for the concept of deference, 
however, as discussed below. 
PROPORTIONALITY AND MARGINALITY 
Recall that the first three steps in proportionality analysis are 
concerned with means-end fit—identifying what the legislature is 
seeking to accomplish and how it is going about accomplishing it. 
It is relatively easy to satisfy the first two steps in the analysis—to 
conclude that the law limits rights in pursuit of a proper purpose 
and that the steps it takes in pursuit of that purpose are rational. 
Legislatures in well functioning democracies do not pass laws for 
no reason nor are they likely to act irrationally, in the minimal 
sense that Barak’s concept of rationality contemplates. 
The third step in the analysis, which asks whether the limit 
established on the right is necessary in order to achieve the 
state’s purpose, is controversial because, as we saw earlier, it 
invites second-guessing by the court on a counterfactual 
question: whether another means of achieving the state’s end—
a policy option not chosen by the legislature—would be equally 
effective in achieving that end while establishing a lesser limit 
on the right. Judges who are confident about their policy-
making expertise may find it easy to conclude that this step in 
the proportionality analysis has not been met, and may even 
downplay the consequences of their conclusion by pointing out 
that there is scope for the legislature to redesign the law in 
question to minimize the rights limitation, and so pass 
constitutional muster.  
The fourth step, proportionality stricto sensu, is the most 
important step and the most difficult, for it involves a weighing/
balancing of the law and the limit it establishes on the right. Barak 
seeks to overcome these difficulties with his concept of 
“marginality.” 
Now, not everyone acknowledges the difficulty of 
determining proportionality stricto sensu. David Beatty has 
 58. Ashwander v Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936). The Ashwander doctrine 
is reviewed and criticized in Fred Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71.  
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argued that proportionality is essentially a matter of fact and 
that objective answers are possible.59 For his part, Robert Alexy 
asserts that some proportionality answers are simply “obvious.” 
To his credit, Barak acknowledges that proportionality 
necessarily involves an element of “judicial subjectivity”60 (p. 
479). The comparison between the benefits of realizing a law’s 
purpose and the cost to a right that the law occasions is “of a 
value-laden nature” (p. 342). There are different political and 
economic ideologies to consider, along with the history of the 
country, the structure of its political system, and its distinct social 
values (p. 349).61  
But Barak thinks that the difficulties with proportionality 
stricto sensu can be overcome by clarifying and limiting the 
comparison with which courts must be concerned: 
[I]t is important to note that the comparison is not between 
the importance of fulfilling the purpose of the limiting law 
and preventing the harm to the constitutional right. Rather, 
the comparison focuses only on the marginal effects—on 
both the benefits and the harm—caused by the law. In other 
words, the comparison is between the margins (p. 350). 
If the problem with proportionality judgments is that they 
are more likely to be declared than demonstrated, Barak’s 
attempt to address the problem adds layers of technical 
complexity to the analysis. Judges must reconsider alternative 
laws—lesser rights-limiting approaches that did not fulfill the 
purpose of the law, and so were not considered viable 
alternatives at the necessity step in the analysis—and 
determine whether any of these alternatives would, if enacted, 
be proportional stricto sensu. Barak explains: 
 59. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW, supra note 26, at 166–76 (footnotes 
omitted):  
Turning conflicts about people’s most important interests and ideas into matters 
of fact, rather than matters of interpretation or matters of moral principle, allows 
the judiciary to supervise a discourse in which each person’s perception of a 
state’s course of action is valued equally and for which there is a correct 
resolution that can be verified empirically.  
Id. at 171. 
 60. But while Barak insists that judges cannot impose their own values on society, he 
cannot promise that this will not occur, and his admonition comes across as elitist: Judges, 
he writes, “should balance between the different interests in accordance with what they 
view as the best interests of the society of which they are a member” (p. 479). He does not 
explain why judges are better placed to determine the interests of society than the political 
community, to which everyone belongs. 
 61. These are, of course, the very sorts of considerations that make comparative 
constitutional law so difficult.  
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Thus, on the first scale—that of “fulfilling the proper 
purpose”—we place the marginal social importance of the 
benefits gained by rejecting the possible alternative and 
adopting the proposed law, while on the scale of “harming the 
constitutional right” we place the marginal social importance 
of preventing the harm caused to the constitutional right from 
rejecting the possible alternative and adopting the proposed 
law. The question examined in this scenario is which has the 
heavier weight on the scales (p. 353). 
There may be many reasons that explain why an alternative 
approach was not chosen by the legislature, but Barak downplays 
the significance of the legislature’s decision. As long as the 
hypothetical alternative advances the purpose a judge thinks that 
the legislature sought to achieve, that is sufficient. If the 
alternative is proportional and the legislature’s choice is not, then 
the law is unconstitutional. 
Barak minimizes the impact of unconstitutionality based on 
a failure of proportionality stricto sensu: 
The legislator is not required to return to the drawing board, to 
its position before the limiting law was introduced. Rather, the 
legislator can reduce the “damage” of the unconstitutionality. 
It can do so by legislating the alternative. That way, benefits 
will be gained and the harm reduced in comparison to the 
situation before the law’s enactment (p.356). 
He acknowledges, as he must, that in legislating the alternative the 
state is not getting the benefits it wanted under the original law. But 
something is better than nothing; the legislature can always pass the 
alternative law, Barak says, and “partial fulfillment should satisfy 
the legislator’s policy considerations” (p. 356).62 
A court’s ability to weigh policy alternatives depends on 
several additional considerations, and these considerations 
require the exercise of discretionary judgments. For example, 
Barak states that the probability of the state’s social goal being 
realized if the rights-limiting measure is approved must be 
considered (p. 358),63 but this necessarily involves conjecture. On 
 62. The trouble is that it is not easy to pass legislation—to generate the required 
political consensus to pass legislation following a judicial decision invalidating a law—
because judicial decisions change the political dynamic. But even if it were easy to pass 
alternative legislation, Barak does not explain why partial fulfillment of legislative purpose 
should satisfy the legislator. 
 63. “The weight of an important purpose, whose realization is urgent and the 
probability of its actual occurrence is high is not equal to the weight of a similarly important 
purpose, whose realization is also urgent but whose probability of occurrence is extremely 
low” (p. 358).   
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the other side of the scale, the weight of the marginal social 
importance of minimizing the limitation of the right depends 
largely on the “social importance” of the right, in addition to the 
scope of the limitation the law establishes on the right and the 
probability that the limit on the right will be realized. 
The concept of “social importance” is fraught with 
difficulties. Although bills of rights do not distinguish between the 
importance of the rights they protect, it seems reasonable to 
suppose that some rights are more important than others. This 
appears to be borne out in the case law, given that it seems easier 
to establish limits on some rights than others. It is also possible to 
observe the existence of hierarchies within particular rights. For 
example, courts may be more solicitous of some types of 
expression (e.g., political expression) than others (e.g., 
pornographic), regardless of their commitment to the importance 
of freedom of expression in the abstract. Yet most bills of rights 
do not establish hierarchies of rights: all constitutional rights 
enjoy the same legal status. 
Given the nature of Barak’s enterprise—the weighing of 
marginalities—he is forced to address the matter head on: he must 
acknowledge, in other words, that his methodology not only 
permits but requires different rights to be accorded different 
weights in the proportionality evaluation. This is where the 
concept of social importance comes in. According to Barak, some 
rights have greater social importance than others, even if their 
legal importance is identical. Which rights? And how do we 
identify them? 
Barak’s answer is brief: some rights are preconditions to the 
realization or enjoyment of other rights and are more socially 
important as a result. On this basis Barak asserts that the rights to 
life, human dignity, equality, and political speech have increased 
social importance. Once again, we find categorical 
pronouncements backed by little or no analysis. But on this topic 
in particular, so important to his theory, Barak’s failure to attend 
to the distinctions he asserts is glaring. He acknowledges that 
there may also be distinctions within the rights he identifies as 
being of higher order importance, but provides no basis for 
drawing the distinctions his approach to proportionality requires. 
Here is all that he says: 
Rights that advance the legal system’s most fundamental 
values and that contribute to the personal welfare of each 
member of the community differ from rights that rely upon 
general welfare considerations as their only justification.  
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Similarly, “suspect” rights, which historically have been limited 
by the majority for improper reasons, differ from rights that are 
not “suspect” in that way. The different perspectives at times 
suit one another. In other cases, they point in different 
directions. We must assume that, with time, it will be possible 
to establish more specific criteria on the matter (p. 361). 
Putting all of this together, Barak proffers a “basic 
balancing rule”: 
The higher the social importance of preventing the marginal 
harm to the constitutional right at issue and the higher the 
probability of such an additional marginal harm occurring, then 
the marginal benefits created by the limiting law—either to the 
public interest or to other constitutional rights—should be of a 
higher social importance and more urgent and the probability 
of its realization should be higher (p. 363). 
Barak’s basic balancing rule is rendered concrete by the 
application of a specific rule of balancing in particular cases, 
operating at a lower level of abstraction. But Barak goes further, 
suggesting that there is a need for a third rule of balancing, which 
he describes as “principled” balancing. And within the context of 
principled balancing, Barak contemplates individuated 
approaches across and within particular rights: “The number of 
principled balancing formulas relating to constitutional rights is 
much higher than the number of constitutional rights” (p. 544). 
These balancing rules are complicated, to say the least, but Barak 
defends their complexity on the basis that it is necessary to take 
into account differences in the social importance of particular 
constitutional rights. 
PROPORTIONALITY AND DEFERENCE 
Given the complexity of the analysis Barak advocates, it 
might be supposed that the need for deference is clear. After all, 
deference is a familiar concept in administrative law and 
potentially has purchase at various steps in the proportionality 
inquiry where limitations on rights are concerned. To defer to a 
decision on a question of constitutional rights is, in general, to 
uphold the constitutionality of limits on rights on the basis that 
they are reasonable, as opposed to “correct” (from the Court’s 
perspective). As Barak puts it: 
[W]e can define deference as a situation where a judge adopts 
an opinion expressed by another branch of government (either 
the legislative or executive) regarding the components of 
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proportionality when, without this expression, the judge would 
not have adopted that opinion (p. 398). 
Deference is significant because it mitigates the impact of 
judicial review and in particular the impact of the judicial power, 
and is advocated for principled and prudential reasons.64 But 
deference is also advocated for tactical reasons, as a means of 
quelling opposition to judicial review. For example, Mattias Kumm 
states: “The fact that a court engages in proportionality analysis 
does not imply anything about the degree of deference it should 
accord political actors. . . . [A] court can inquire more or less 
searchingly whether the relevant prongs of the test are satisfied.”65 
Deference appears to have no meaningful role to play in 
Barak’s conception of proportionality because judicial exclusivity 
is his bedrock: judges must determine all of the questions when it 
comes to the law. Barak draws on Marbury v. Madison for 
authority: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.”66 The Court simply must 
exercise this responsibility, he writes: “Any other approach would 
lead to anarchy within the system” (p. 394).  
Anarchy is a bit much, and so is Barak’s assertion that “[t]he 
approach that a judge should defer to the legislative or executive 
branches does not fit a constitutional democracy” (p. 399). 
Although Barak argues that all levels of government must apply 
proportionality analysis whenever limits on rights are to be 
established, and acknowledges that discretion is involved in 
making the proportionality determinations, he insists that the 
judiciary is the only branch of government whose view of the 
requirements of the constitution matters: “Any other solution 
would seriously impede democracy” (p. 387). Barak 
acknowledges that legislatures legislate on the basis of social and 
 64. See Aileen Kavanagh, Deference or Defiance? The Limits of the Judicial Role in 
Constitutional Adjudication, in EXPOUNDING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 12, at 184; 
see also Aileen Kavanagh, Defending Deference in Public Law and Constitutional Theory, 
126 Law Q. Rev. 222 (2010); Aileen Kavanagh, Judicial Restraint in the Pursuit of Justice, 
60 U. TORONTO L.J. 23 (2010). 
 65. Kumm, Socratic Contestation, supra note 30, at note 55 (emphasis added). 
Elsewhere Kumm has enumerated four relevant considerations for deference, but these 
are stated at a high level of generality and he does not explore them in any detail. Kumm, 
Democracy is Not Enough: Rights, Proportionality, and the Point of Judicial Review, 
NYU Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers , Paper 118 (2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1356793; see also KAI MÖLLER, 
THE GLOBAL MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 200-03 (2013) (emphasizing a 
concept of deference as reasonableness (as opposed to correctness) in reviewing answers 
reached at the stricto sensu stage of proportionality analysis). 
 66. 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).  
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polycentric facts that are not necessarily accommodated by the 
rules of evidence, but insists that courts are as capable of learning 
from legal argument as legislatures are from legislative committee 
processes. 
So confident is Barak in the ability of judges that he 
dispatches the idea of deference in four pages. First, he cites what 
he describes as the three most common justifications for 
deference: “the lack of democratic legitimacy for judging; the lack 
of institutional capacity; and finally, judicial wisdom” (p. 398). 
This is followed by the announcement: “None of these 
justifications is proper” (p. 398). Not only is deference improper 
on rights questions, but in public law more generally. Barak 
dispatches Chevron67 deference in judicial review of 
administrative action in a paragraph. The literature is rich but the 
doctrine is “misplaced,” he asserts, for it undermines the judicial 
function set out in Marbury. 
There is indeed an enormous body of work on deference, 
much of which is written by proponents of proportionality, but 
Barak does no more than list it in a footnote (p. 397 n. 71).68 His 
conclusion appears to be categorical: 
[Deference] has no place when the question is the 
proportionality of a limitation on a constitutional right. . . . 
[T]here is no room to argue that there are certain categories of 
cases, like national security or emergencies, where the judge 
should exercise deference to the legislative or executive 
authority. . . . The approach that a judge should defer to the 
legislative or executive branches does not fit a constitutional 
democracy (p. 399) (footnotes omitted). 
But it turns out that Barak will countenance deference, at 
least to some extent, albeit under a different name. For example, 
he endorses the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the 
necessity branch of the proportionality test, which upholds a limit 
on a right provided that it is reasonably necessary, or limits a right 
as little as reasonably possible. Although this is widely understood 
as deference in Canadian law, Barak says that it simply reflects 
the fact that legislation is not a science, and there may be a range 
of choices that satisfy the requirements of proportionality. 
 67. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 
(1984). A similar deferential approach is well established in Canadian 
administrative law, reiterated most recently in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 
1 S.C.R 190 (Can.). 
 68. In a subsequent footnote he states: “There are those who are of the opinion that 
judicial deference should be exercised in certain circumstances” (p. 397 n. 81).  
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But recall that the fourth step in proportionality analysis—
proportionality stricto sensu—is the most important to Barak, and 
he is unwilling to defer at this step. Thus, deference at the third 
step in the analysis is a cost-free concession. Proportionality is, for 
Barak, ultimately a legal question for judges to decide, and on his 
account it is to be judged strictly rather than deferentially. 
CONCLUSION 
The shift to rights-centred constitutionalism signified by the 
adoption of bills of rights in most democratic countries renders 
judicial review on rights questions inevitable, and courts will 
necessarily be involved in adjudicating matters of public policy. 
Like most proponents, Barak regards proportionality analysis as 
necessary and inevitable. All that remains, then, is the perfection 
of its methodology. 
I doubt that the problems posed by proportionality analysis 
can be resolved by rendering the methodology pure. One thing 
that should be clear, however: proportionality analysis leads to a 
considerable expansion of judicial power, especially in the hands 
of a confident practitioner like Barak. 
 
